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Along with structural maladjustment and exchange rate volatility (the
themes of the previous two parts of this volume), the ballooning of internal
and external debt can be viewed as the final member of the 'terrible trio' of
economic maladies in the 1980s. And these themes interact. The sharp
increase in the U.S. internal and external debt in the first half of the 1980s
was often singled out as the most important cause of the real appreciation of
the dollar, and in turn of the internal imbalance between the U.S. manufac-
turing and services sectors. In less-developed countries the links between
external debt, exchange rate adjustment, and structural problems have been
even more direct. In some countries heavy external debt burdens lead
governments to distort exchange rates, fix domestic prices, inhibit imports,
and other combinations of structural and exchange rate remedies.
This final part of the volume contains papers which emphasize theoretical
aspects of internal and external debt. In each case, they provide examples of
the way in which economic events stimulate economic ideas. The emergence
in the United States of a large structural fiscal deficit (i.e., corrected for the
business cycle) stimulated a substantial amount of new theoretical work on
the long-run sustainability of fiscal deficits, and the implications of fiscal
deficits for external borrowing and for the interaction of monetary and fiscal
policy. One of these theoretical contributions appears as the first paper in
this part of the volume, 'Current and Anticipated Deficits, Interest Rates,
and Economic Activity', by Olivier J. Blanchard. The paper takes as its point
of departure a 'new view' that fiscal deficits hurt rather than help an
economic recovery after a recession; it examines the relationships among
anticipated future internal government deficits, current real interest rates,
and real output.
Starting from first principles, Blanchard begins by constructing a formal
model in which outstanding government debt influences consumption and
saving decisions and thus interest rates, despite the fact that individuals treat
government as transparent and thus discount fully all future tax payments
(this is the assumption of BarroRicardian equivalence). In his model,
uncertainty regarding life expectancy makes individuals require interest in
excess of pure time discount as an inducement to hold bonds. The resulting
non-neutrality implies a positive relationship between the size of the current
government debt and the contemporary short-term interest rate.358 Introduction to Part III
The main conclusions follow directly. Progressively increasing deficits
create expectations of higher future debt and thus higher future short-term
interest rates. These expectations in turn raise the current long-term interest
rate and thus depress real activity. Whether or not this depressive rate effect
is large enough to offset the traditional Keynesian stimulus to demand (as
would be necessary to confirm the 'new view') depends on the quantitative
importance of the relative effects. The object of the model is to demonstrate
that a perverse effect is possible and plausible.
A qualification of the Blanchard paper, recognized by the author, is that
he deals only with the effects of deficits within closed economies. If deficits
are anticipated to be much larger in the U.S. than in other countries, then in
open economies with international capital mobility there would be large
movements in exchange rates. Indeed, the large appreciation of the dollar
that peaked in 1985 is widely believed to have been caused in large part by
the emergence of the U.S. structural fiscal deficit.
The emergence of an international 'debt crisis' was a continuing feature of
the 1980s and generally refers not to the growing external debt of the U.S.
but rather that of the developing countries. The problem suddenly emerged
into the consciousness of academicians in August, 1982, at the time of the
Mexican debt crisis, when Mexico became unable to pay the interest and
principal due on its ballooning debt, and when lenders refused to advance it
any additional funds. In one interpretation, the huge debt of the developing
countries was a side-effect of the supply shocks of the mid and late 1970's,
and of the role of banks in the developed countries in 'recycling' the
surplusses of oil-producing nations to the poorer oil-using nations. Some of
the developing countries, e.g., Mexico and Venezuela, were themselves oil
producers, borrowed to support a consumption boom under conditions of an
overvalued currency and capital flight, and then found that they could not
roll over short-term debt when the price of oil began to drop after 1981.
The last two papers in this volume deal not with the specific events that
led to the debt crisis of the 1980s, nor with the details of its resolution (which
is not yet complete), but rather with first principles essential to understand
the nature and effects of international lending for any country in any era.
The first of these is 'The Pure Theory of Country Risk' by Jonathan Eaton,
Mark Gersovitz, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. Their analysis helps to clarify a
number of central issues. They distinguish among default, insolvency, and
illiquidity in the context of a multi-period model in which default has future
consequences. They stress that internal debt is a legal obligation, enforceable
in courts, and thus differs from external debt for which repayment is largely
voluntary with only indirect penalties possible. Collateral plays little role in
external debt, because there is little that a creditor can do to seize it.
The authors use several simple models to focus on a key issue in interna-
tional lending, the need for creditors to devise penalties that provide incen-Introduction to Part III 359
tives for debtors to avoid default, and to maintain credibility in applying the
penalties. They discuss two models, in one of which lenders do cut off credit
from those who are in default (as part of a reputational equilibrium), but in
the other they do not, and the market ceases to function. They also draw a
parallel between the incentive problems of external lenders and the tradi-
tional problem of domestic bank runs. The paper contains no empirical
analysis but rather provides a number of comments and guidelines on how
econometric studies of external debt should be carried out. The authors
conclude by stressing the central role played by the enforcement problem and
the absence of collateral, both of which make the international credit market
differ fundamentally from domestic financial markets. They emerge surprised
that there was so much lending to developing countries, in light of the
evident risks for creditors. They do not believe that their analysis allows
predictions to be made about future repayment behavior by debtors, or
future extensions of new loans by creditors.
The final paper in the volume is 'Growth and External Debt under Risk of
Debt Repudiation' by Daniel Cohen and Jeffrey D. Sachs. They take as given
the theoretical insights of the previous paper and examine their implications
for the growth patters of developing countries. Their paper is an abstract
analysis of the pattern of growth of a nation which borrows abroad and which
has the option of repudiating its foreign debt. The authors show that the
equilibrium strategy of competitive lenders is to make the growth of the
foreign debt contingent on the growth of the borrowing country.
The result is a two-stage pattern of growth. During the first stage, the debt
grows more rapidly than the economy. During the second stage, both the
debt and the economy grow at the same rate, and more slowly than in the
first stage. During this second stage, the total interest falling due on the debt
is never entirely repaid. Only an amount equal to the difference between the
rate of interest and the rate of growth of the economy, multiplied by the level
of the debt, should be repaid each period. This permanent refinancing of
part of the interest is the only way for a country to reach the optimum
pattern of growth consistent with no default.